Child labour and conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America
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Foreword

In the last ten years, conditional cash transfer programmes have acquired a noteworthy relevance in Latin America.

At the XVI American Regional Meeting of the International Labour Organization (ILO), its constituents -- governments, employers and workers -- proposed including child labour eradication in social and economic policies and programmes. One component of these would be conditional cash transfers to get children into (or back into) the education system, including vocational training, and keep them there. This proposal has been incorporated into the 2006-2015 Hemispheric Agenda for generating decent work in the Americas.

Although conditional cash transfer programmes are a valuable contribution to the alleviation of poverty, the child labour factor has to be taken into account if they are to achieve their goals.

This document analyses the contribution of these programmes to the prevention and eradication of child labour. The conclusions and recommendations include results of the working sessions, deliberations and contributions of the First Latin American Meeting on Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and their Impact on the Prevention and Elimination of Child Labour: A Legal Rights Approach, held in San José, Costa Rica, on 20 and 21 November 2007. The meeting was jointly organized by the Government of Costa Rica, the International Labour Office (ILO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It was attended by technical and political heads of such programmes in 14 countries in Latin America, representatives of other Latin American countries, a delegation from Ghana and experts from international bodies.
Executive Summary

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes are a new social policy tool in Latin America. They have an immediate effect on the income of poor beneficiary families, relieving their poverty while attempting to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty in the medium and long term by transferring funds to families which meet certain goals or responsibilities, primarily concerning education, health and nutrition.

Fifteen CCT programmes in 14 Latin American countries have been identified, numbers that reflect the importance these programmes have acquired. There have been two distinct waves or generations of such programmes. The first generation, beginning in the 1990s, included: the Programa de Asignación Familiar de Honduras (Family Assignment Programme of Honduras); the 1995 Bolsa Escola (School Grant) in Brazil, renamed the Bolsa Família (Family Grant) in 2003; the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (Child Labour Eradication Programme), also in Brazil, which began in 1996; the Mexican Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (Education, Health and Food Programme), which began in 1997 and in 2002 changed its name to Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades (Human Development Opportunities); and the Bono Solidario (Solidarity Bond), which began in Ecuador in 1998, and in 2003 became the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Bond). In 2000, two such programmes started: the Familias en Acción (Families in Action) programme in Colombia and the Red de Protección Social (Social Protection Network) in Nicaragua. The year 2002 saw the creation of Chile Solidario (Solidarity Chile) programme, as well as of the Programa de Ingreso Para Desarrollo Humano (Income for Human Development Programme) in Argentina, which, together with the Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Unemployed Heads of Household Programme), led to the 2005 Familias por la Inclusión Social programme.

In view of the important short-term impact that these programmes have on poverty (as a consequence of the cash transfers), their potential medium and long-term impact, and international support for this new social policy tool, many countries have adopted such programmes or broadened existing ones.

The “second generation” of these programmes began with four in 2005: Red Solidaria (Solidarity Network) in El Salvador, Red de Protección y Promoción Social (Social Protection and Promotion Network) in Paraguay, Juntos (Together) in Peru and Solidaridad (Solidarity) in the Dominican Republic. In 2006, two more were launched: Avancemos (Let’s Advance Together) in Costa Rica and Red de Oportunidades (Opportunity Network) in Panama.

All of these programmes target the poorest among the population. To select their beneficiaries, the general approach is to use instruments specially designed for them (identification systems and selection of individual beneficiaries), although certain countries have opted for a geographical focus.

The benefits granted and conditions imposed vary with the country. The cash transfer amounts depend on the number of family members and their age, so that no single amount can be cited for each country. The usual practice is to give the money to the mothers.

All of the programmes set conditions concerning education: all children and adolescents (though with age-range differences) must enrol for and attend school. In many cases, non-attendance limits are set. Health conditions concern vaccinations, prenatal check-ups and health discussions. However, some countries go further and require that births take place at health centres only. Nutrition conditions mainly involve monitoring children’s growth.
rates. Other conditions include no child labour, involvement in community activities or obtaining an identity card.

In terms of cost and coverage, there are two mega-programmes: Bolsa Família, with 11,100,000 beneficiary families and a 2007 budget of over US$4 billion, and the Oportunidades programme, with 5,300,000 beneficiary families and a 2007 budget of US$3 billion. Then come Argentina’s Familias por la Inclusion Social, Chile’s Solidario and Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano. The rest have less coverage and smaller budgets.

One of the major findings is that reducing child labour is not an explicit objective in the majority of current conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America. In only two programmes is it among their general or specific goals: i) the PETI programme in Brazil, which is a large-scale programme specifically designed to attack this problem; and ii) the Costa Rican Avancemos programme. This latter targets adolescents from poor homes, trying to keep them in school or to have them go back if they have dropped out. Its specific goals include reducing teenage labour.

The CCT programme evaluations have been analysed in terms of child labour for some of these programmes: PETI, Progress/Opportunity, Human Development Bond (HDB), Families in Action, Family Assignment Programme (FAP) and Social Protection Network. All of them show the same findings: the CCT programmes reduce child labour in terms of the number of children and the number of hours involved. In short, they are an excellent means for countries to help prevent or reduce child labour.

It follows that countries with very high rates of child labour which run these programmes should make reducing child labour a specific goal. Although it is clear that these programmes can contribute to achieving that objective, further action, both within and outside the CCT programme itself, is needed.

A cash transfer by itself is not a guarantor of a successful programme, nor is prohibiting the beneficiary from engaging in child labour. There are other factors, cultural ones especially, which reflect attitudes and beliefs and where a strong educational basis is needed to go beyond the cash transfers. Complementary action which affects these attitudes and beliefs is needed to get a child labour component into the programmes.

The CCT programmes are ‘demand-side measures’. To be successful, they must improve the supply of services, guarantee schools, teachers, health centres, etc., and so help meet the conditions of the programmes. However, it is also necessary to go beyond this and take action against child labour, such as the Jornada Ampliada (Extended Day) within the PETI programme, which has yielded excellent results.

Evaluation is a key element in programme success, as the Progresa/Oportunidades case demonstrates. Evaluations have to be carried out periodically, in depth, and both internally and externally. Most importantly, they have to be used to bring in all the corrective measures needed to enhance a programme’s impact.

The most common evaluation practice for these programmes in Latin America is to use experimental or quasi-experimental designs with treatment groups and control groups, both selected at random. In addition, it is crucial to have a base line as well as periodic follow-up information, preferably supplied by a study panel.

The majority of programmes have only made very short-term evaluations (a year or two after beginning). Although these are important for taking corrective measures, they constrain understanding of the programme’s potential. It is also necessary to re-evaluate
all such programmes which have reached ‘maturity’, and draw lessons from them for shorter programmes.

Qualitative studies are another important part of the evaluation process. Their findings may provide a better understanding of the quantitative impact, as with child labour. Qualitative evaluation therefore needs to be incorporated into the programme's evaluation plan well in advance.

Finally, even though the major recommendation is to include the prevention or reduction of child labour among the specific objectives of these programmes (if it is not there already), we propose that every country consider for itself whether or not to do so. Given the particularities of every country regarding child labour and the characteristics of the CCT programme, we propose assessing the impact on child labour within the programme cycle (design-evaluation-redesign), and using the results when it comes to redesigning the programme.
Introduction

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes are a new social policy tool in Latin America. They have an immediate effect on the income of poor beneficiary families, relieving their poverty while attempting to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty in the medium and long term by transferring funds to families which meet certain goals or responsibilities, primarily concerning education, health and nutrition.

Although, as we shall see in this study, the majority of Latin American countries which have these programmes do not set reducing child labour as an explicit objective, there is widespread recognition that such programmes can contribute to eradicating child labour.

The International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) of the International Labour Organization (ILO) considers that a greater understanding of the effects of these programmes on child labour is crucial for the provision of support services that are essential to eradicating child labour.

The present study is only part of a larger study by IPEC entitled Child Labour: Cause and Effect of the Perpetuation of Poverty. Its goal is to study the impact of the conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin American countries on child labour. The findings will generate recommendations to enhance their impact on the dimensions considered. The first version of the study was presented at the First Latin American Meeting on Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and their Impact on the Prevention and Elimination of Child Labour: A Legal Rights Approach, which took place in San José, Costa Rica, on 20-21 November 2007. This study draws on the presentations and discussions at that meeting.

Only published and open information sources were used in this study, both to describe the programmes and to assess their impact. This was a limitation, because for some programmes it was not possible to obtain current data on programme coverage and costs, nor to obtain the results of certain internal evaluations. However, the programmes with restrictions were only a minority.

The report is divided into four chapters and three appendices (not included here in printed version). The first chapter presents the main features of the programmes of this type found in Latin America, and makes some global comments on them. The second chapter analyses the main findings of studies of the impact on child labour of the transfer programmes that are conditional. The third chapter makes some general comments on the abovementioned Latin American meeting. The fourth and final chapter presents the main conclusions and recommendations of the study. Appendix 1 provides information about the cash transfer programmes in Latin America that are conditional. Appendices 2 and 3 provide the agenda and the list of participants at the Latin American meeting.

The author wishes to thank Guillermo Dema, sub-regional coordinator of the IPEC Programme in Central America, Panama, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Haiti; Jesus de la Pena; and David Lopez for their valuable comments on the draft of this report. He is grateful to the participants in the Latin American meeting, whose interventions have added a great deal to this report.

The opinions expressed in this study reflect the personal views of the author and in no way implicate any of the people mentioned above or the ILO.
1. CCT programmes in Latin America: an overview

There have been non-conditional money or cash transfer programmes in Latin America for many years, in the form of non-contributory pension programmes, family support, etc. There have also been programmes with a specific form of conditionality, such as school scholarships. In the last few years, a series of programmes with broader conditions, emphasizing human capital (education, health and nutrition), have become more popular.

These programmes have a double impact. In the short term, cash transfers help alleviate poverty among households. In the medium and long term, conditions, especially concerning education and health, favour the development of children's capabilities, which in turn expands their future job opportunities, and thus breaks the inter-generation poverty trap.

We have found 15 conditional cash transfer programmes in 14 Latin American countries, numbers which reflect the importance they have acquired within the region. Appendix 1 of this report describes the main characteristics of each one (not included here).

Table 1 lists the programmes by country and starting date. The first programme of this type, among those still ongoing, was the 1990 Programa de Asignación Familiar de Honduras (PRAF).1 This programme was created as a social compensation plan to support the poorest segment of the Honduran population in the wake of the structural adjustment programme carried out that year. In 1992, the Honduran Congress put the PRAF on a permanent footing.2

Four more programmes were initiated in the second half of the 1990s. In 1995, the Brazilian Bolsa Escola programme started. In 2003, it became the Bolsa Família. It began in the state of Brasília, and latter extended throughout the country. In 2001, the Federal Government of Brazil adopted the Bolsa Família on a national scale.

In 1996, the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI)3 began in the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Mato Grosso, in the east-central region of Brazil, and in the state of Bahia, in the northeast of Brazil. As its name indicates, its objective was to end child labour, especially in coal and agriculture. It later extended to other states, and in 1999 it was reformed and extended to all the regions of Brazil, including the urban areas.

In 1997 the Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) began in Mexico’s rural areas. In 2001, it expanded into semi-urban areas, and in 2002 throughout the urban centres. Its name changed to Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades.

In 1998, the Bono Solidario also known as the “Poverty Bond” was established in Ecuador to mitigate the impact of eliminating fuel subsides and raising electricity prices. In 2003, the Bono Solidario changed into the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH).

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1 Family Assignment Programme, Honduras.
2 Information about this programme is limited and difficult to obtain.
3 Child Labour Eradication Programme.
Table 1
CCT programmes in Latin America, by country and starting date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Starting date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF)</em></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bolsa Família</em></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1995/2003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI)</em></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Oportunidades</em></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1997/2002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono de Desarrollo Humano</em></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1998/2003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Familias en Acción</em></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Red de Protección Social</em></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chile Solidario</em></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Familias por la Inclusión Social</em></td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2002/2005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Juntos</em></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Red Solidaria</em></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Red de Protección y Promoción Social</em></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Solidaridad</em></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Avancemos</em></td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Red de Oportunidades</em></td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Starting dates of original and current programmes.

In 2000, two programmes were launched. One, Familias in Acción, was set in motion in Colombia to mitigate the negative effects of the economic crisis and fiscal adjustment on the most vulnerable groups of its population. The other, in Nicaragua, started through an IDB loan⁴: Phase I (the pilot phase) of the Red de Protección Social programme, which was to last for the next three years. A second phase ran for another three years, until 2006, after which it does not seem to have continued.

In 2002, Argentina launched two complementary programmes, the Programa de Ingreso para el Desarrollo Humano (IDH) and the Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (PJHD) as a response to the economic crisis which was afflicting the country. In 2004, the “income-based” programmes were restructured, leading to the 2005 Familias por la Inclusión Social programmes, which managed to absorb the beneficiary families of the previous two.

In 2002, the Chile Solidario programme was created in an attempt to cut extreme poverty, the reduction of which had come to a halt.

The short-term impact of these programmes, and their cash transfers, on poverty, together with the expectation of a more permanent impact in the medium to long term, led the international community to endorse this new social policy tool, and many countries decided either to launch such programmes or to expand existing ones.

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⁴ IDB loans are granted by the Inter-American Development Bank.
This led to a ‘second generation’ of programmes, four of which begin in 2005: El Salvador’s Red Solidaria, Paraguay’s Red de Protección y Promoción Social, Juntos in Peru and Solidaridad in the Dominican Republic. There were two more in 2006: Avancemos in Costa Rica and Red de Oportunidades in Panama.

Beneficiary Selection

All the programmes are directed at the poorest segment of the population. The selection criteria for the beneficiaries vary, although the tendency is to use tools specifically designed for them:

- the Sistema de Identificación y Selección de Familias Beneficiarias de Programas y Servicios Sociales (SISFAM) in Argentina
- the Registro Único de Programas Sociales do Governo Federal “CadUnico” in Brazil
- the CAS file in Chile.
- the Sistema de Selección de Beneficiarios para Programas Sociales (SISBEN) in Colombia.
- the Sistema de Información de la Población Objetivo (SIPO) in Costa Rica.
- the Sistema de Identificación y Selección de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales (SELBEN) in Ecuador.
- the Sistema Único de Beneficiarios (SIUBEN) in the Dominican Republic.

Other countries, such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Panama, have taken a geographical focus approach.

Benefits and Conditions

The benefits and conditions vary from country to country. The cash transfer amounts generally depend on the number of members in a household, so that no single sum can be cited for each country.

To provide a comparative perspective, Table 2 shows typical monthly cash transfer amounts per country.

The transfer amounts generally vary according to the number of children, their ages and even the state of pregnancy of women. They are assigned to the family, with two exceptions: PETI and Avancemos (in Brazil and Costa Rica, respectively) in both of which resources are assigned according to each child.

The common practice is to hand the money to the mothers.

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5 System of Identification and Selection of Beneficiary Households for Programmes and Social Services.
6 Brazilian Federal Government’s “CadUnico” Single Registry of Social Programmes.
7 Social Programme Beneficiary Selection System.
8 Target Population Information System.
9 Social Programme Beneficiary Identification and Selection System.
10 Single Beneficiary System.
Table 2
CCT programmes in Latin America: (current) transfer amount and conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Monthly transfer amount (US$)</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Familias por la Inclusión Social</strong></td>
<td>50 to 98 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolsa Familia</strong></td>
<td>9 to 56 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETI</td>
<td>12.50 to 20 per child</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile Solidario</strong></td>
<td>6 to 17 / 167**</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Familias en Acción</strong></td>
<td>(20+ **) per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avancemos</strong></td>
<td>29 to 96 per student</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bono de Desarrollo Humano</strong></td>
<td>11.50 to 15 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Red Solidaria</strong></td>
<td>15 to 20 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRAF 1/</strong></td>
<td>24 to 96 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oportunidades</strong></td>
<td>(16.50 to 170) + ***</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Red de Protección Social</strong></td>
<td>10 to 18 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Red de Oportunidades</strong></td>
<td>35 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Red de Protección y Promoción Social</strong></td>
<td>10 to 30 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juntos</strong></td>
<td>33 per family</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solidaridad</strong></td>
<td>17 / 9 to 19****</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The first amount (6 to 17) is for the **Bono de Protección Familiar** - Family Protection Bond (per family), while the second (167) is for pension assistance (per person).
** The family receives a US$ 20 subsidy for food plus US$ 6 or US$ 12 for each child, according to age.
*** Food support is US$ 16.50. There are also education grants. Together, they can come to as much as US$ 170, depending on the number of children and the school grade they are attending, plus US$ 23 for every adult.
**** The first amount (17) is for the **Solidaridad** programmes (for food / per family), whereas the second (9 to 19) is a school attendance incentive (per family).
1/ The information on this programme needs to be checked.

Table 2 summarizes the conditions. All the programmes set requirements in education, namely that all children and adolescents (though with age-range differences) must enrol for and attend school. In many cases, non-attendance limits are set. The Costa Rican **Avancemos** programme is the only one specifically directed at secondary school education (grades 7 to 11).

Health conditions generally concern vaccinations, prenatal check-ups, check-ups for healthy children and health discussions. However, some countries go further and require that births take place at health centres only.

Nutrition conditions mainly involve monitoring children’s growth rates.

Other conditions include no child labour (PETI in Brazil), involvement in community activities or obtaining an identity card.

Coverage and Cost

There are two mega-programmes in terms of coverage and cost (Table3): Bolsa Familia, with 11.1 million beneficiary families and a 2007 budget of over US$ 4 billion, and the Oportunidades programme, with 5.3 beneficiary families and a 2007 budget of US$ 3 billion.

Next are Argentina’s Familias por la Inclusión Social, Chile’s Solidario and Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano.

Then come the other programmes, although for some of them information about the number of beneficiary families, their expenditure or their budgets was hard to find.
Table 3
CCT programmes in Latin America
Beneficiaries and costs, most recent year available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Beneficiaries by year</th>
<th>Cost per year (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familias por la Inclusión Social</td>
<td>454,000 families (2006)</td>
<td>400 million (2007)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolsa Familia</td>
<td>11,100,000 families (2007)</td>
<td>4,100 million (2007)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avancemos</td>
<td>70,000 adolescents (2007)</td>
<td>28 million (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bono de Desarrollo Humano</td>
<td>1,200,000 families (2006)</td>
<td>360 million (2007)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Solidaria</td>
<td>24,000 families (2006)</td>
<td>50 million (2006)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAF 1/</td>
<td>80,000 families (2006)</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oportunidades</td>
<td>5,300,000 families (2006)</td>
<td>3,300 million (2007)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red de Protección Social</td>
<td>36,000 families (2006)</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red de Oportunidades</td>
<td>34,000 families (2007)</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red de Protección y Promoción Social</td>
<td>9,000 families (2006)</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juntos</td>
<td>160,000 families (2007)</td>
<td>100 million (2006)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Budgeted.
1/ The information on this programme needs to be checked.

Child Labour

Only two programmes have a reduction in child labour among their general or specific goals:

- the Brazilian PETI, which is a large-scale programme specifically designed to attack this problem;

- the Costa Rican Avancemos, which targets adolescents from poor homes, trying to keep them in school or to get them to go back if they have dropped out. Its specific goals include reducing teenage labour.

Conclusions

CCT programmes exemplify what is known as 'demand-side intervention', which means promoting the use of social services (demand) in education, health, nutrition and elsewhere on behalf of the local beneficiary population (generally the poorest). Tabatabai (2006) considers that poor people lack access to these services for several reasons: they lack information about them, there are high direct involvement costs (transport, school uniforms, textbooks, etc.) and high opportunity costs (the child labour income, for instance, is what households stop receiving when child workers attend school).
In order for demand-side intervention to work, the services must match the demand for them. They must, that is, provide enough schools, teachers and health infrastructure of sufficient quality. However, the only programme here which explicitly mentions the supply of services is the Costa Rican *Avancemos* programme, which lists the improvement of education and training as one of its key goals.
2. The impact of CCT programmes on child labour

Although reducing child labour is not an explicit goal for the majority of conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America today, empirical evidence suggests that these programmes play a very relevant role in reducing child labour in the region. This chapter draws on research to analyse their impact on child labour.

For analytical purposes, we have divided the CCT programmes into two groups. The first consists of the PETI programme, which was designed to eradicate the worst forms of child labour and explicitly forbids\(^\text{11}\) child or adolescent beneficiaries to work. The second group consists of all the other programmes.

2.1 Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI)

This is the only programme in Latin America specially designed to withdraw girls, boys and adolescents (between 7 and 15 years of age) from dangerous, heavy, unhealthy or degrading forms of labour. The programme explicitly states as a condition that “all children who are less than 16 years old must be withdrawn from any form of child labour.”

One of PETI’s impact assessments, which was widely published, was done by Yap, Sedlacek and Orazem (2001). The authors collected information from six rural municipalities in three Brazilian states (Pernambuco, Bahia and Sergipe). They looked at two groups: a treatment group formed by three municipalities where PETI was being run (one in each state), and a control group, formed by the other three municipal governments (again one per state), which had similar socioeconomic traits to the first group but where PETI was not being run.

Two hundred households with at least one boy or girl between the ages of 7 and 15 were selected at random from each municipality. The income per capita of the household was a key criterion for the programme. Every household gave information about the homes, the fathers, the mothers, daughters and sons. The PETI beneficiary households also stated the number of participants in the programme and the year they joined it.

The study of the control and treatment groups began in 1999. In Pernambuco the programme had begun in 1996, so a three-year impact was examined. In Sergipe, the programme had begun in 1997 (a two-year impact), whereas in Bahia it had begun in 1998 (a one-year impact).

Five indicators were used to measure the impact of the programme: school enrolment, workforce participation, working hours, work sector and highest qualification obtained.

Although the parents promised not to have their children work while they were beneficiaries of the programme, they did not always meet this condition. Nevertheless, the programme’s impact was in general positive on the boys and girls who took part. They dedicated more time to school and less time to economic activities, less time to dangerous work, and made more and faster progress at school.

In the specific case of child labour, the study found that the probability of boys and girls between 7 and 14 years old working fell between 5 and 6 percentage points in

\(^{11}\) The Peruvian Juntos programme stresses that beneficiaries must attend on at least 85% of the days when educational activities take place at their schools, and that they should not miss class “to do agricultural or other labour”, although this is not made a condition.
Pernambuco, by around 18 percentage points in Bahia and by 4.5 percentage points in Sergipe. The greatest impact was in Bahia, as a consequence of two factors: a) Bahia had the highest initial child labour rate; and b) it became the only state in Brazil where girls and boys outside the programme attended a Jornada Ampliada. This led the authors to conclude that after-school attendance was essential to combating child labour through this type of programme.

PETI appears to succeed better with part-time child workers than with those who work longer hours. The likelihood of working less than 10 hours fell between 5 and 9 percentage points for the children in the programme, depending on where and when it was run. This is very important because it shows that efforts to eradicate child labour have to be greater -- and maybe different -- for children who work long hours.

A World Bank study of child labour in Brazil (World Bank 2001) looked at several qualitative aspects of PETI in two states (Bahia and Pernambuco). It found that only a minority of adult beneficiaries considered it necessary for children to attend school (18 per cent in Bahia and 11 per cent in Pernambuco) and over half of them did not believe that child labour harmed their children's development.

This shows how cultural factors, reflected in deeply rooted attitudes and beliefs about education and child labour, must be taken into account when running programmes. They go beyond cash transfers.

2.2 The other CCT programmes in Latin America

None of the CCT programmes examined in this section, with the exception of the Costa Rican Avancemos programme, explicitly refers to child labour.

Although Avancemos has reducing child labour among its goals, no specific action or conditions different from those included in mainstream programmes are laid down as means to achieve that goal.

The logical relationship between CCT programmes and a reduction in child labour is therefore the same in all the cases considered here: as household income rises (through the transfer of funds), so too will school enrolment and attendance, and child and mother health and nutrition, thus contributing to a reduction in child labour.

The next section looks in detail at assessments of the impact of these programmes on child labour. There are a significant number of assessments of their impact on education, health, etc., and several on their overall impact (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003; Rawlings, 2004; Villatoro, 2005) as well as that specifically on child labour (Tabatabai, 2006). All of them complement the current study, which focuses on evaluation.

The link between child labour and CCT programmes generally derives from the work of Skoufis and Parker (2001) about Progresa (since renamed Oportunidades). This is our starting point, too.

12 The work generally quoted is the expanded Skoufias and Parker, 2001; but it was originally published as Parker and Skoufias, 2000, which is the paper used here.
2.2.1 Progresa/Oportunidades

The Parker and Skoufias study (2000) was based on the information collected by Progresa from a sample of 506 eligible localities in the rural areas, where the programme began. 320 localities were assigned at random to receive benefits (treatment group) and the 186 remaining localities were a control group designated to receive the benefits almost two years later. All the households (24,077 altogether) in the treatment and control localities were interviewed before the programme (Encuesta de Características Socioeconómicas de los Hogares - Encaseh, 1977)\(^{13}\) and afterwards, using Encuestas de Evaluación Rural (Encel)\(^{14}\) approximately every six months. Information was gathered on education, use of health services, household expenditure, the situation of women, community indicators, etc.

The authors used Encaseh (1977) as a base line, against which the November 1998, March 1999 and November 1999 Encel surveys showed a reduction in participation by the Progresa children in the (rural) labour market, be they male or female and their activities wage or non-wage.

Progresa reduced the likelihood of boys between 12 and 13 years old working by 15 per cent to 20 per cent. For boys between 14 and 15 years old, the reduction was 15 per cent, although for boys between 16 and 17 years old there was no significant reduction in the likelihood of working.

Although girls were little involved in labour before the programme began, there were also significant reductions associated with Progresa. For girls of 12 and 13 years old, the effects were significant only in the first round after the programme, with approximately 15 per cent less labour participation. For girls of 14 and 15 years old, the effects were greater and more significant across time, showing an 18 per cent to 25 per cent reduction in the likelihood of working (depending on the round). The effects of Progresa were not significant for girls of 16 and 17 years old, as in the case of boys. Apparently, Progresa had no effect on participation in the labour force by boys and girls in this age group.

This pioneer study for Progresa was followed by several further evaluations in the era of Oportunidades. Parker, Behrman and Todd (2004) analysed the medium-term impact of the Oportunidades programme on education and rural labour for those between 9 and 15 years old in 1997. Their findings add to the 1998 and 2000 evaluations using data from the Encuesta de Evaluación Rural (Encel). New information was obtained from the 2003 Encel survey, which was linked to previous data, especially from the 1997 Encuesta de Características Socioeconómicas de Hogares (Encaseh 1997). The 2003 Encel provided a new batch of information on the original treatment and control households, which had begun to receive benefits from the Oportunidades programme in 1998 and 2000, respectively.

The analysis strategy included direct verification of the impact through two different approaches. First, the effect of the treatment was calculated by “differences in differences” using the original 1997 treatment and control groups for girls and boys in the different age ranges. These estimates compared individuals from the initial treatment, who had received benefits for nearly 5.5 years, with individuals from the original control group, who by 2003 had received benefits for approximately 4 years. These estimates therefore refer to an impact whose length differed by approximately 1.5 years.

\(^{13}\) 1977 Socio-economic Household Survey.
\(^{14}\) Rural Evaluation Surveys.
The second group of estimates compared those in the treatment group since 1998 with a group in 2003 which had not received the benefits of the programme. It therefore estimated the impact of the programme after five and a half years.

In terms of child labour, the results for boys and girls were ambiguous. For boys, medium-term (5.5 years) exposure to the programme led to a 35 per cent to 29 per cent reduction in the likelihood of working for those who were 10 to 14 years old in 1997 (16 and 20 years in 2003).

On the other hand, the findings for differential exposure show lower reductions, around 4 per cent, in the group of boys 9 to 15 years old in 1997 (15 to 21 in 2003). In addition, there was a significant negative effect on participation by boys in agricultural labour. Before the Oportunidades programme, girls participated far less in the labour market, and the Programme had few significant effects on their working. This is in line with previous evaluations, which showed little effect on girls, except as regards domestic labour.

In 2004, the Oportunidades programme was evaluated in an urban setting (Todd et al., 2004).

The impact assessment compared boy and girls from participating households with girls and boys from households with a right to participate but which did not do so. Both groups of urban households had enrolled for and attended a programme module to obtain benefits, although some received them and some did not. The sum of these households is less than the total number of households “with a right to the programme” since it does not include ones which did not register, those that did not know of the programme’s existence and those in areas where Oportunidades was not yet available. This was a constraint, which the authors tried to allow for and thereby isolate the impact of the programme.

The study was based on the Encuesta de Evaluación de Hogares Urbanos (Encelurb), which collected data in two rounds. The initial batch was collected in autumn 2002, before the participating households had received the benefits of the programme. The next batch was collected a year later, in autumn 2003, after the participating households had been in the programme for one year and received its benefits. Data were collected both from households inside the areas of intervention and from a sample of households outside the areas of intervention.

The findings showed that after one year’s participation in the programme, there was a significant reduction in the percentage of workers among children 12 years old and over enrolled in the Oportunidades programme. The greatest impact was on males of 19 or 20 years old: the proportion of those working fell by 24 percentage points (a 48.6 per cent reduction). The impact on girls was less pronounced: among those aged 15 to 18, the proportion who worked fell by five percentage points (a 36.7 per cent reduction).

Finally, a 2001-2002 qualitative evaluation in semi-urban communities of 2,550 to 50,000 inhabitants (Escobar and González de la Rocha 2002) examined the changes among households and semi-urban communities which enrolled in the programme in September 2001, drawing on a 2002 re-analysis. The study looked at six communities.

Although the authors found no substantial reduction in child labour until 14 years of age, in terms of children stopping work completely, they found that the Oportunidades programme had involved the three main players (school, family and the children themselves) in negotiations which, in most cases, led to improved school attendance and

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performance, even though the children continued to work both inside and outside their households. The children’s work adjusted so that they could remain in school. Although the change was small, the authors considered that it could be cumulative.

The sense and meaning of child labour for the families interviewed varied among families and communities. The authors found four main interpretations: a) a necessary ‘initiation’ into the world of adulthood; b) to avoid problems connected with ‘vagrancy’, such as drug addiction and gang membership; c) a form of savings for their fathers and mothers, since children could purchase their own clothing and feed themselves; and d) an additional source of household income.

2.2.2 Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH)\(^\text{16}\)

An evaluation by Schady and Araujo (2006) about this programme discusses child labour. Among its conclusions was that children in the programme were less likely to be sent to work than if they had not been in it.

The evaluation used an experimental design. Initially, out of 1,391 households, 3,072 boys and girls of school age were randomly selected. They were separated into two groups: a treatment group and a control group. None of the households had received the transfer before the study. Then the households in the treatment group were selected for the transfer and the households for the control group were left out of the programme. A household survey collected information before the intervention and followed up a year later (the base line was June-August 2003 and the follow up survey was January-March 2005). It therefore considered short-term impact.

The authors found that the BDH had a high positive impact on school enrolment and attendance, and a high negative impact on child labour: school enrolment increased by around 10 percentage points, whereas child labour fell by 17 percentage points. The probability of a boy or girl from any household receiving the BDH working was 6.2 percentage points less than for those not receiving the bond. Boys and girls in households receiving the BDH worked 2.5 hours less than girls and boys who did not receive the BDH.

A “multinomial logit” model suggests that the BDH changed boys and girls from “no education” to “education only” rather than shuttling them between school and work. This can be interpreted as showing that school attendance and work are alternatives among the poor households of Ecuador.

2.2.3 Familias en Acción\(^\text{17}\)

An evaluation by Gomez (2005) used a quasi-experimental design which compared the differences between the beneficiary and non-beneficiaries in two groups: treatment and control. Measurement was taken at two different times, using two surveys: the 2002 base line (June-October) and a 2003 first follow-up (July-November). Only 6 per cent of households interviewed were lost between the two surveys.

In each of the two surveys 11,500 households were interviewed in 122 municipalities (57 treatment and 65 control). The programme began in the rural areas, although it later expanded to the most economically depressed urban areas. In this assessment, all the municipalities were rural; the term “urban area” is used to designate the most urbanized areas within those municipalities.

\(^{16}\) Human Development Bond programme.

\(^{17}\) Families in Action programme.
The evaluation showed a significant reduction in labour (though no figures were given) by boys and girls between 10 and 13 years old in the rural areas, and a reduction in the number of working hours for boys and girls between 14 and 17 years old in the urban areas (again, no specific figure was mentioned).

Another evaluation, by Attanasio et al. (2006), also used a quasi-experimental design with treatment and control groups at two different times: a baseline estimate and a first follow-up (June-October 2002 and July-November 2003). As with the previous study, the municipalities were rural, although their most urbanized areas were considered separately.

The findings showed that participation in school activities increased by 5 to 7 percentage points for youths from 14 to 17 years old, but that the impact on school enrolment and attendance was lower among the younger population: between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points (especially because so many were outside the programme). The effect on work was generally greater among the younger population, whose involvement in domestic labour fell by 10 to 12 percentage points, although there was no impact on participation in income-generating activities.

They also found that school and work time did not fully overlap, suggesting that part of the extra school time came out of the children’s free time. The greatest substitution effects were among those aged 14-17 in the urban areas and 10-13 in the rural areas, for whom over a quarter of the extra school time came from time they would otherwise have devoted to work.

2.2.4 Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF)\(^{18}\)

The PRAF was the earliest of all the CCT programmes considered in this research. It started as an emergency social compensation programme in 1990. For a time, known as phase two or PRAF II, it was run with an IDB loan. The programme was re-launched in 2000.

Assessment of the programme’s impact in this phase was entrusted to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), which suggested an experimental design known as ‘random assessment by conglomerates with a factorial fix and repeating measures.’ This entailed three measurements of four groups: a baseline measurement (between August and December 2000), an intermediate measurement (between May and October 2002) and a final measurement (originally set for July-October 2004 but never done); the groups were: demand, supply, supply and demand combined, and control.

Seventy municipalities were selected; within each of them, 8 communities were randomly chosen, and within every one of those, 10 households were selected. Since some households had more than one family living in them, the sample contained at least 5,600 families.

Those two surveys thus provided the intermediate measurement. In 2003, the IFPRI issued the first results of this evaluation, although child labour was not mentioned. Despite this, by using the same data and various statistical methods, Olinto and de Souza (2005) obtained new results from it. The result: a 7.4 percentage point increase in the effect on child labour, bringing it up to approximately 16 per cent. The authors explained this significant and counter-intuitive finding by the baseline survey (2000) having coincided with the coffee harvest, in which many boys and girls took part. An estimate by the same authors, using different methodology, suggested that the PRAF had no impact on child labour.

\(^{18}\) Family Assignments programme.
Despite its design, further factors affected the evaluation findings. The most important was the itinerant, migratory nature of the beneficiaries, and the limitations of the follow-up system. Besides this, after 2002 other programmes took place in the municipalities that were part of the evaluation groups, as part of the Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza\(^\text{19}\). What the PRAF did added to what other organizations and institutions did, affecting the treatment and control groups, contaminating the evaluation findings and making it hard to isolate the effects and attribute them to the action being evaluated. For example, municipalities with only supply-side measures and municipalities with no intervention (control group) received benefits which included demand-side measures like scholarships and ‘free enrolment’ programmes. Municipalities with only demand-side measures and municipalities with no intervention (control group) received benefits through supply-side measures like a broader health service package.

Several lessons were learned from this evaluation process. First, the dates when the information (baseline or follow-up) is gathered are crucial and must therefore be well planned -- for instance, by taking seasonal cycles into consideration -- especially from the child labour perspective. In addition, these programmes must be part of overall social policy, so as to avoid overlaps and get a fuller picture of the beneficiary population.

### 2.2.5 Red de Protección Social (RPS)\(^\text{20}\)

The RPS programme began in 2000 with an IDB loan. It had two phases over five years. Phase 1 was a three-year pilot phase. After that, the IFPRI conducted an impact evaluation, and in 2002 the IDB and the Nicaraguan government agreed to extend it for another three years.


Information from the 1995 population census was used to design the programme. Forty-two regions eligible for the programme because of their extreme poverty were selected. Half of them were selected at random for the programme (treatment group) whereas the other 21 were left out of the programme and comprised the control group.

Information on the households and their members was collected both before and after intervention. The same procedure was used for the treatment group and the control group in a yearly household panel survey (2000 baseline, 2001 and 2002). A ‘double difference’ method was used to find the ‘mean impact rate’ for the programme.

As regards child labour, the percentage of children aged 7-13 who worked fell by 5.6 percentage points.

### 2.2.6 All other programmes

None of the other programmes have explicitly evaluated their impact on child labour. The only exception was an evaluation for the Costa Rican ‘Superémonos’ (Let’s Do Better) programme, which operated for a while before the current ‘Avancemos’ (Let’s Move Forward) programme.

In the Duryea and Morrison (2004) evaluation, households had been randomly selected to be participants or non-participants. 746 participating families and 1,042 non-participating families were interviewed in two parts: the first between April and May 2002 and the second in August of the same year.

\(^{19}\) The Strategy to Reduce Poverty framework covered various combined initiatives.

\(^{20}\) Social Protection Network.
Reducing child labour was not an explicit objective of Superémonos, and indeed no impact on child labour was detected by any of the statistical methods used by the authors.

Finally, in spite of their magnitude, neither the Bolsa Escola nor the later Bolsa Família have been properly evaluated from a child labour perspective. The available evaluations are from the early years of the current decade (for Bolsa Escola) and have a very narrow geographical focus.
3. The Latin American Meeting on Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and their Impact on the Prevention and Elimination of Child Labour: A Legal Rights Approach

This conference was held in San José, Costa Rica, on 20 and 21 November 2007. It was organized jointly by the Costa Rican Government, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme. It was attended by technical and political heads of such programmes in 14 countries in Latin America, by representatives of other Latin American countries, a delegation from Ghana and experts from international bodies. The conference agenda is in Appendix 2 of this document and the list of participants in Appendix 3 (not included here).

The conference had a two-fold objective. It sought both to promote the sharing of experience of running conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin American countries, and to analyse the impact of those programmes on child labour. In both cases, it succeeded.

Each country made a brief presentation which generally covered the following aspects, though not all countries mentioned all of them: i) origin of the conditional cash transfer programme; ii) the programme’s objectives, beneficiary population, selection criteria, benefits, co-responsibilities; iii) current coverage (total and percentage of the target population), total annual cost and funding sources; iv) expected impact and its measurement: indicators and results; and v) the link between the programme and child labour.

The presentations were made in blocks: South America (Chile, Peru, Argentina and Bolivia in one block, and Ecuador, Colombia and Paraguay in another); Central America and the Dominican Republic (Costa Rica, then Panama, El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic). As the Brazilian and Mexican programmes were the largest ones, they were presented separately.

Although they did not have any conditional cash transfer programmes, Belize, Guatemala and Uruguay also participated in the conference. A representative was also invited from Ghana, an African country that is running a programme of this kind which drew heavily on the first generation programmes in Latin America for its design.

Bolivia presented its Bono Juancito Pinto, which, being a municipal programme, was not part of the global survey.

The country presentations confirmed and expanded some of the results that have emerged in the previous chapters in this study. Four of them are the most important ones. In the first place, cutting child labour was not among the explicit objectives of the CCT programmes, with the exceptions already indicated. Second, the CCT programmes were generally not tied to action to guarantee the services needed to meet the conditions, again with exceptions. Third, the current coverage of some programmes was very limited, because of the limited budget resources that they had. Fourth and last, despite the above, the evaluations made of the programmes looked at child labour and the results were satisfactory.

Besides the country presentations, there were also very interesting presentations by representatives of the government of Costa Rica (the Minister of Housing and Human Settlement and the Vice-Minister of Housing and Social Development), by representatives of the international organizations which co-organized the event (the ILO, UNICEF and the
UNDP), as well as by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, Costa Rica (FLACSO/Costa Rica) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Those presentations dealt with child labour and poverty, anti-poverty programmes in Latin America with a focus on human rights, and the role of CCT programmes in reducing poverty and child labour.

After the presentations, very fruitful exchanges took place in each of the blocks about the experience of the countries and the issues covered. There followed a plenary debate on the political and operational value and viability of specifically including child labour reduction objectives in conditional cash transfers programmes.

Diverse points of view emerged. Nevertheless, there was a practical consensus on five aspects:

i) Conditional cash transfer programmes do reduce child labour, even though this is not a specific objective of the programmes.

ii) CCT programmes are an interesting potential way to help prevent/reduce child labour, although they must not become the main instruments for doing so. Comprehensive economic and social policies -- of which these programmes are a part -- are a necessary condition for making a significant impact on this scourge.

iii) Including the reduction of child labour among the specific objectives of CCT programmes can help to strengthen their impact on child labour.

iv) It is important to evaluate the impact of CCT programmes on child labour in the programmes' design-evaluation-redesign cycle, so that each country can decide whether or not to include a specific child labour reduction objective.

v) In taking that decision, each country must consider the particular features of its economic and social situation, as well as of child labour, of the CCT programme itself, and of the panorama of social programmes within the country.
4. Conclusions and recommendations

The purpose of the current research is to analyse the impact which the conditional cash transfer programmes in the Latin American countries have had on the prevention and reduction of child labour, then to make recommendations on increasing that impact.

It is important to look at studies which have analysed the impact of the CCT programmes from a wider perspective and made recommendations (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003; Rawlings, 2004). Nevertheless, here the stress is on child labour (as in Tabatabai, 2006).

We see that although the reduction of child labour is not an explicit objective for the majority of the conditional cash transfer programmes currently under way in Latin America, they do have a positive and significant impact that contributes to its reduction.

Several evaluations show that the impact on child labour is greatest among boys and girls over 14; in the case of PETI, the reduction was in dangerous work. Since all of the countries in Latin America have approved the Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as ILO child labour Conventions No. 138 (except Mexico) and No. 182, these programmes help them to comply with their international commitments.

Cash transfers alone do not guarantee the success of the programmes in reducing child labour, nor does prohibiting the beneficiary persons from working. The reason for this lies in the cultural factors behind deeply entrenched attitudes and beliefs about education and child labour. These should be taken into account in programmes which go beyond cash transfers. Including a child labour objective and component in such programmes requires strong complementary action to modify attitudes and beliefs.

In conclusion, therefore, these types of programmes are an important tool in seeking the prevention and reduction of child labour. Because child labour is such a complex issue, steps to prevent, reduce or eradicate it must be multi-dimensional, with these programmes being just one among many instruments.

As the research highlighted, the CCT programmes constitute ‘demand-side intervention’. However, for them to be effective, it is necessary to improve the supply of schools, teachers, health facilities, etc., so that the conditions of the programme can be met. Indeed, it is critical to go further and, from the child labour perspective, take action such as PETI’s ‘Jornada Ampliada’ (Extended Day), which had excellent results.

Evaluation is crucial to any programme’s success, as shown by the Progresa/Oportunidades case. Assessment has to be periodic, in depth, both internal and external. Most importantly, it should be used to introduce any corrective measures needed to enhance the programme’s impact.

The most common evaluation practice for this programme in Latin America has been the use of quasi-experimental designs, with both treatment and control groups, selected at random. Additionally, it is vital to have baseline information and periodic follow-up information, preferably from study panels. The studies considered here can teach us important lessons about the way to carry out impact analysis and its limits.

Most programmes had only very short-term evaluations (one or two years after they began) -- good for introducing corrective measures, but a constraint on understanding the true potential of this type of programme. It is vital that all programmes which have ‘reached a certain maturity’ are evaluated anew, both for their own benefit and to serve as examples for the other, shorter programmes.
In this case, the evaluation for Progresa/Oportunidades was especially significant, as it considered the medium term impact of the programme on education and labour among rural children who were 9 to 15 years old in 1977.

Qualitative studies are also an important part of the evaluation process, because they provide results which help us to understand the impact of quantitative factors, as in the case of child labour. For this reason, qualitative assessments (including baseline comparisons) should be scheduled within a programme’s evaluation plan.

Finally, even though the major recommendation is to include the prevention or reduction of child labour among the specific objectives of these programmes (if it is not there already), we propose that every country consider for itself whether or not to do so. Every country has its own particular needs and characteristics in terms of child labour and CCT programmes. We therefore propose that each programme assesses its impact on child labour within the design-evaluation-redesign cycle, and uses the outcome to redesign the programme.
References


